Montenegro adopts new Competition Act in further alignment to the EU acquis: Key changes and their practical implications

On the wave of legislative reforms taking place over the past six months in the context of Montenegro’s accelerated efforts to meet its EU accession obligations and close negotiation chapters, the Montenegrin Parliament has voted a new Competition Act on 25 March 2026. What started as a set of amendments to the existing law quickly proved too ambitious in scope, ultimately leading to the adoption of an entirely new Competition Act. The new legislation has not yet been published in the Official Gazette but is expected to enter into force on the day of its publication.

The new legislation significantly aligns the national competition law with the EU competition law framework, in particular the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and Directive (EU) 2019/1 (the ECN+ Directive). However, the urgency with which the new legislation was adopted may soon give rise to a need for amendments, in order to achieve fuller harmonisation with the EU acquis.

The new Competition Act explicitly provides that the national competition law framework is to be interpreted in accordance with the principles developed in the EU legal instruments, including the soft law. The Government is required to publish a list of such instruments, together with their official translations. In practice, this means that EU guidance will play an increasingly important role in the interpretation and application of the Montenegrin competition rules, particularly in the context of the newly introduced self-assessment regime.

Although the new Competition Act brings about substantive changes to the powers of the Agency for Protection of Competition ("Agency") when investigating infringements, it does not vest it with the power to impose fines on the infringers. Instead, the legislation perpetuates the dual enforcement track shared by the Agency and the courts.

We outline in the following text key changes and their impact on the companies operating on the Montenegrin market.

Restrictive agreements: a shift to self-assessment

Transition to the self-assessment regime is the most important change in the context of restrictive agreements. Under the previous legislation, companies had the obligation to submit their restrictive agreements that did not qualify for a group exemption to the Agency for an individual exemption. This is no longer the case, as the new legislation explicitly provides that an exemption from the prohibition does not require a prior approval of the competition authority.

Instead, the undertakings are now required to conduct a self-assessment as to whether their agreement meet the statutory conditions for individual exemption. In the event of an investigation, the burden of proof that the agreement meets those conditions is on the parties to the agreement. This reform aligns Montenegro with the EU system introduced by Regulation 1/2003 and shifts compliance responsibility from the national competition authority to the undertakings themselves.

For undertakings, this is both good news and a serious responsibility. Individual exemption procedure required time and resources and for that reason it often deterred commercially meaningful arrangements. However, since self-assessment is not a straightforward exercise, in order to ensure compliance, companies will need to either engage experienced competition law advisors or invest in the training of their in-house legal teams, or both.

Merger control: no filing deadline and streamlined phase I

In the area of merger control, the Competition Act abolishes the 15-day filing deadline for notifying concentrations, while maintaining the standstill obligation. This is a welcome change as the parties will have more flexibility in structuring and timing their transactions while the purpose of the merger control regime is preserved.

Another important change is that the transactions will have to be cleared within 30 days from the submission of a complete notification, unless an investigation is opened within this deadline. The Agency has the obligation to issue a confirmation of completeness of the filing, specifying the date from which the notification is deemed complete. It remains to be seen whether this will indeed speed-up the proceedings in those cases which do not create genuine competition law concerns, given that the Agency can prevent the commencement of the 30-day deadline by issuing requests for additional information. Unfortunately, the notification thresholds remain very low and meetable by one undertaking only (the cumulative conditions being combined turnover of EUR 20 million worldwide and EUR 1 million in Montenegro in the year preceding the concentration). This means that a significant portion of the Agency’s resources will likely remain invested in the review of non-problematic concentrations.

As explained below, the fine for gun-jumping is significantly reduced (see Section Fines for competition law infringements and for procedural breaches).

Agency's power to gather evidence

The new law significantly boosts the Agency's evidence-gathering powers.

Inspections outside of business premises

On a reasonable suspicion that relevant business records are held outside of the official premises of the undertaking under investigation, the Agency is authorised to carry out inspections at other locations, including private homes, land or vehicles of directors, members of management bodies and employees. Such inspections are subject to a prior authorisation by the Administrative Court, which must issue its decision within two days from the Agency’s application.

Continued inspection

When it is not feasible to review or copy data on-site, the Agency may continue the inspection at its own premises, provided it gives the opportunity to the legal representatives of the undertaking concerned to be present during such continued inspection. This means that, while the Agency may transfer large volumes of data (including entire servers) on its portable drives, it cannot subsequently review that material without the presence of the party’s lawyers.

Refined leniency framework

The new Competition Act aligns the conditions for leniency with respect to immunity and reduction of fines with those from the ECN+ Directive. In addition to that, the law provides enhanced protection for leniency statements and introduces restrictions on access to and use of such materials in subsequent proceedings. The rules on access to file and the use of evidence have been further clarified to safeguard the effectiveness of leniency programmes while ensuring the rights of defence. An implementing decree is supposed to lay down more detailed provisions on leniency applications.

Power to take oral statements from third parties

The new Competition Act expands the Agency’s power to collect evidence by explicitly authorizing it to take oral statements from any legal or natural person and not only from the parties to the proceedings. In addition, the Agency may invite third parties to submit their amicus observations and participate in oral hearings.

Authorization to set enforcement priorities; Commitments

The Agency is also explicitly authorized to set enforcement priorities in the areas of restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance, meaning it has discretion to decide where to focus its resources.

Further enforcement flexibility is found in the new rules on commitments. While the requirement for a market testing of the proposed remedies, is introduced, the Agency has been granted full discretion to evaluate the commitments proposal. Under the previous law, the acceptance of commitments was subject to a set of cumulative conditions. The initial draft of the new Competition Act relaxed this approach by reducing the number of conditions and introducing a discretionary standard. However, the final version of the law adopted by the parliament removes all conditions, effectively granting the Agency full discretion in deciding whether to accept the proposed measures.

Extended deadline for a response to the Agency's statement of objections

Under the previous legislation, parties under investigation had only eight days to submit their responses to the Agency’s statement of objections. This deadline is now extended to 15 days, which is still short, in particular in complex proceedings. Unfortunately, the law does not explicitly authorize the Agency to extend this deadline at the party's request. This creates uncertainty as to whether the deadline can be extended, given that such possibility is under the general law on administrative procedure reserved only for deadlines which are stipulated as extendable.

The Agency remains without the power to impose fines

Despite earlier expectations, the new Competition Act does not vest the Agency with the power to impose fines on the infringers. It only has the power to initiate misdemeanour court proceedings against the infringers and request the court to impose a fine.

This means two parallel enforcement tracks continue to exist. The Agency determines infringement in administrative proceedings, which determination is subject to judicial review by the Administrative Court, while the imposition of fines is within the competence of courts.

The Agency can initiate court proceedings for imposition of fine even before it has decided on whether the infringement exists, but not later than three years counting from the date when the infringement occurred. The absolute statute of limitations is extended from four to six years counting from the date when the infringement occurred.

In this respect, the Montenegrin model departs from the model prevailing across EU Member States, which concentrates the power to determine the infringement and the power to impose fines for the infringementin the hands of a single administrative authority.

By replacing the mandatory wording shall be fined with a discretionary standard may be fined, the new Competition Act gives the Agency discretion as to whether to request imposition of fines from the court.

Fines for competition law infringements and for procedural breaches

In case of serious infringements that directly harm competition (e.g. cartels, abuse of dominance, or unlawful concentrations), a fine of up to 10% of the infringer's worldwide turnover can be imposed. Underthe old law, the lowest end of the range of a fine for substantive law infringement was set at 1% of the undertaking's relevantturnover. This floor has been removed, allowing for greater flexibility in determining the appropriate amount of fine.

By contrast, fines of up to 1% of turnover apply to less serious violations that undermine the Agency’s investigative and enforcement powers (e.g. providing incorrect information or obstructing inspections), aiming primarily to secure effective cooperation and the integrity of the enforcement process. A fine for implementation of a concentration without prior clearance (gun-jumping), if concentration is ultimately cleared following the investigation, is also capped 1% of the worldwide turnover of the party whobreached the stand-still obligation.

The Agency may impose periodic penalty payments until the market participant complies with its procedural order, such as the order to provide information, or submit to an inspection, or until it implements a measure imposed by the Agency's infringement decision. . Under the previous law, periodic penalty was a fixed monetary amount linked to the undertaking’s turnover and subject to a cap, while the new Competition Act ties the periodic penalty to the undertaking’s average daily worldwide turnover.

Finally, in line with the ECN+ Directive, the new law stipulates that a fine to be imposed on an association of undertakings is a percentage of the combined turnover of the association's members. If the association is unable to pay the fine, it must call on its members to contribute to the payment of the fine. Where such contributions are insufficient, the court may require payment directly from individual members, primarily those involved in the decision-making bodies of the association, and, if necessary, other members active on the relevant market. Members who can demonstrate that they neither implemented nor were aware of the infringing decision or had expressly distanced themselves from the decision before the initiation of the infringement proceedings cannot be held liable to pay the fine imposed on the association.

Transparency of the Agency's decisions

The Agency is under the new law required to publish the full text of its decisions, subject to redaction of confidential information granted pursuant to the affected party's confidentiality request. Under the previous framework, the Agency published only the operative part of its decisions, with limited insight into the underlying reasoning. The obligation to publish full decisions is expected to provide full insight into the Agency’s reasoning and thus contribute to consistency in enforcement.

Conclusion

The new Competition Act significantly increases the responsibility of companies for ensuring their own compliance with competition rules. The shift to self-assessment requires undertakings to proactively evaluate their agreements and internal practices without relying on the Agency and its clearance.

While the merger control regime is improved with the removal of a strict filing deadline and a more disciplined review timeline, due to the low notification thresholds, a large number of non-problematic transactions will continue to be captured by the filing obligation.

By keeping the power to impose fines out of the Agency's hand, an opportunity to streamline enforcement has been missed. The continued existence of parallel administrative and judicial proceedings will continue to negatively impact the overall effectiveness of the enforcement system and create complexity for businesses.

Overall, companies can expect a more mature enforcement environment, however, with residual structural inefficiencies. Proactive compliance will be more important than before.