For decades, competition law focused almost exclusively on prices paid by consumers and on competition in product markets. Agreements affecting wages, hiring, or employee mobility were largely seen as matters of employment law and HR relations, rarely attracting antitrust scrutiny. Today, competition authorities increasingly view labour markets as a critical battleground for competition enforcement, recognising that collusion over wages or recruitment can be just as harmful to economic welfare as price-fixing cartels. The result is a rapidly developing body of soft law and case-law treating practices such as no-poach agreements, wage-fixing and the exchange of sensitive employment information as core competition law infringements – most often by object and, in some jurisdictions, even subject to criminal sanctions.
Why?
Restrictive agreements in labour markets can distort competition in multiple ways. Practices limiting employee mobility, suppressing wages, or reducing competition for talent, may diminish productivity, innovation, and allocative efficiency. The harm is not inflicted upon employees only, but it may translate into the reduced quality of output and slower technological progress, affecting consumers. From an economic perspective, collusion in labour markets mirrors classic cartel conduct on the purchasing side of markets, where firms exercise buyer power to depress input prices below competitive levels.
How are the competition authorities framing labour market restrictions?
Against this backdrop, several competition authorities have adopted guidance clarifying how competition rules apply to labour markets, while intensifying enforcement activity. At EU level, the European Commission published in May 2024 a Policy Brief on Antitrust in Labour Markets.[1] In June 2025, it adopted its first infringement decision concerning a no-poach agreement, imposing a combined EUR 329 million fine on Delivery Hero and Glovo for participating in a cartel in the online food delivery sector. National competition authorities have followed suit. The Portuguese Competition Authority imposed a total fine of EUR 3.1 million in February 2025 for no-poach agreements in the technology consulting sector[2], while the authorities in Belgium[3], Denmark and Finland[4], France[5], and Spain[6] have opened investigations or issued reports addressing labour market restrictions. The Turkish Competition Authority has recently gone further than many EU jurisdictions by issuing in December 2024 dedicated guidelines on competition in labour markets, closely aligned with EU competition law and explicitly classifying wage-fixing and no-poach agreements as infringements by object akin to traditional cartels.[7] In the United Kingdom, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) adopted in September 2025 a detailed guidance on, and subsequently imposed fines for, wage coordination and information exchange involving freelancers.[8] In the United States, enforcement has reached an even more severe level, with the Department of Justice securing its first criminal conviction for a wage-fixing conspiracy in April 2025 in the US v. Lopez case.[9]
By contrast, competition authorities in the Western Balkans have so far paid relatively limited attention to labour market restrictions as a distinct category of antitrust infringement. While general prohibitions on cartels and restrictive agreements could, in principle, capture wage-fixing or no-poach arrangements, there has been little explicit guidance or enforcement practice addressing these issues. Given the convergence of international enforcement trends and the increasing scrutiny of labour markets within the European Competition Network, it can reasonably be expected that authorities in the region will begin to focus more closely on such conduct. Against this background, it is timely to outline key competition law principles governing labour market restrictions and to assess how they are applied in leading jurisdictions.
Labor market practices potentially infringing upon competition law
No-poaching agreements
No-poaching agreements are arrangements under which one undertaking limits its ability to recruit workers from another undertaking. They can take different forms. Some are “no-hire” agreements, where employers commit not to employ counterparty’s staff, whether through active recruitment or in response to unsolicited applications. Other types of agreements are narrower non-solicitation or “no-cold-calling” agreements, under which employers refrain only from actively approaching or enticing another firm’s employees, while formally remaining free to hire them if the initiative comes from the worker. All such arrangements may be reciprocal, binding all parties equally, or one-way, where only one undertaking commits not to hire or solicit the counterparty’s staff. Whether the commitment is unilateral or mutual does not generally alter the competition law assessment of these restrictions.
Competition authorities generally regard no-poaching agreements as serious infringement. From a legal perspective, such arrangements are typically characterised as market sharing agreements, whereby undertakings divide or allocate the supply of labour among themselves. In the EU, they are assessed under Article 101(1)(c) TFEU as restrictions by object.[10] The CMA has adopted the same approach, emphasising that even informal or unilateral no-poach commitments may fall within the prohibition.[11]
The economic harm associated with no-poaching agreements is well established. By restricting employee mobility, these arrangements reduce workers’ outside options, weaken their bargaining power, and may result in lower wages or poorer working conditions. They also prevent firms from accessing the most suitable talent, thereby undermining efficient matching in the labour market and slowing innovation.
Wage-fixing agreements
Wage-fixing agreements arise where undertakings competing for the same category of workers coordinate on wages, benefits, or other key terms of employment. This may involve fixing absolute wage levels, agreeing on wage caps, aligning wage increase rates, or coordinating on fringe benefits that materially affect employees’ remuneration and job choices.
Authorities consistently treat wage-fixing as one of the most serious forms of labour market collusion. Legally, wage-fixing is conceptualised as price-fixing on the purchasing side of the market, with wages constituting the price paid for labour. As such, wage-fixing agreements are considered restrictions by object under EU law and are classified as cartels under both Turkish and UK competition law. The Turkish guidelines explicitly equate wage-fixing agreements with classic output-side price-fixing cartels.[12]
The CMA has also made clear that wage coordination through industry forums or trade associations (including pay rate recommendations) is unlawful.[13] Coordination facilitated by a third party, such as a trade association or consultant, does not shield the participating undertakings from liability.
In the United States, the criminal conviction in US v. Lopez underscores the seriousness with which wage-fixing is now treated internationally, reinforcing the deterrent effect of enforcement in this area.
Exchange of commercially sensitive information
The exchange of commercially sensitive information between competitors in labour markets represents a more nuanced category of potential infringement. Information exchange may, in certain circumstances, generate efficiencies, for example by reducing information asymmetries or facilitating benchmarking. However, where the information exchanged reduces strategic uncertainty and enables coordination on wages, hiring, or employment conditions, it may restrict competition.
Competition authorities assess information exchange by reference to the nature of the information, the manner of exchange, and the characteristics of the market. Information relating to current or future wages, planned pay increases, recruitment strategies, or other working conditions that materially influence employee mobility is typically regarded as competitively sensitive. Even unilateral disclosures can infringe competition law, as the recipient is presumed to take such information into account unless it clearly distances itself.
Both the Turkish Competition Authority and the CMA provide detailed guidance on when information exchange is unlikely to raise concerns. Generally, information that is genuinely public, sufficiently aggregated, anonymised, and historic (Turkish CA explicitly provides that information that is at least three months old is considered historic)[14] is less problematic. By contrast, exchanges involving a small number of participants, non-aggregated data, or information that can be traced back to individual undertakings are more likely to facilitate collusion. The Turkish CA provides a useful benchmark, according to which information should include at least the data of 10 participants, with no single participant’s data having a share of more than 25% in the total data, in order for information to be considered aggregated.[15] Recent CMA enforcement against sports broadcasters for sharing pay information relating to freelancers demonstrates how information exchange can, in practice, function as a mechanism for wage coordination.[16]
What about collective bargaining?
Collective bargaining occupies a distinct position in competition law analysis. Negotiations between employers and workers’ representatives, including trade unions, aimed at determining wages or working conditions are generally recognised as a legitimate feature of labour relations. Competition authorities, have made it clear that they will not seek to enforce competition law against genuine collective bargaining, irrespective of whether the workers involved are employed or self-employed.[17]
However, the scope of this protection is not unlimited. While coordination among employers or workers to prepare for collective bargaining may be permissible, it must not spill over into broader market coordination outside the bargaining context. In particular, employers should avoid exchanging competitively sensitive information among themselves unless such exchange is strictly necessary and appropriately safeguarded, for example through anonymisation and aggregation by an independent third party.
No-poaching or wage-fixing as ancillary restraints
Ancillary restraints constitute an important, but narrowly construed, exception in the assessment of labour market restrictions. A restraint may be considered ancillary where it is directly related to, necessary for, and proportionate to the implementation of a legitimate main agreement that is not itself restrictive of competition.
Competition authorities apply a strict three-part test. First, the restraint must be directly related to the main agreement, meaning that it would not exist independently of that agreement. Second, it must be objectively necessary for the implementation or maintenance of the main agreement. A mere convenience or increased profitability is insufficient. Third, the restraint must be proportionate, in that it does not go beyond what is required in terms of scope, duration, geographic coverage, or affected employees.
In practice, wage-fixing and no-poach clauses rarely satisfy these criteria. Authorities emphasise that less restrictive alternatives are often available, such as confidentiality obligations, narrowly tailored non-compete clauses compliant with labour law, or training repayment arrangements. Where a restraint fails to meet all three criteria, it will be assessed as a standalone infringement by object.
Importantly, the CMA has clarified that narrowly tailored non-solicitation clauses in legitimate commercial agreements, such as secondment or consultancy contracts or other agreements between service providers and their customers might not infringe competition law, but only where they are strictly necessary for the agreement to be carried out, proportionate, and limited in scope and duration.[18]
Possibility of exemption
The possibility of exempting labour market restrictions under general exemption provisions is extremely limited. While, in theory, agreements that generate efficiencies and consumer benefits may qualify for exemption, competition authorities consistently presume that wage-fixing and no-poach agreements are unlikely to satisfy the relevant conditions. Their restrictive nature, combined with the availability of less anti-competitive alternatives, makes it difficult to demonstrate that such agreements are indispensable or that their benefits outweigh the harm to competition.
The Turkish guidelines explicitly state that wage-fixing and no-poaching agreements, as well as information exchanges aimed at restricting competition, cannot benefit from exemption as a rule.[19] The European Commission adopts a similarly sceptical approach under Article 101(3) TFEU, and the CMA’s guidance leaves little room for efficiency defences in this context.[20]
What should businesses do?
Even though competition authorities in the Western Balkans have not yet focused on labour market restrictions, international experience shows that scrutiny is only a matter of time. Businesses should therefore take a proactive approach: review all HR and recruitment practices to ensure there are no agreements, either formal, informal, one-way, or reciprocal, with competitors on hiring, wages, or employee mobility. Furthermore, businesses should be vigilant to avoid wage-fixing and coordinated salary increases, to handle any benchmarking or pay information through independent, anonymised channels, and ensure that collective bargaining with employees or freelancers stays within legitimate limits.
Training HR and recruitment staff on competition law, establishing internal reporting processes, and maintaining clear boundaries around sensitive information are essential. Staying compliant protects your employees, shields your business from risk, and keeps the market competitive.
[1] Available at: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/adb27d8b-3dd8-4202-958d-198cf0740ce3_en
[2] Available at https://www.concorrencia.pt/en/articles/adc-fines-inetum-group-anti-competitive-practices-labour-market
[3] Available at: https://www.belgiancompetition.be/sites/default/files/content/download/files/20240703_Press_release_27_BCA_0.pdf
[5] Available at: https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/en/press-release/no-poach-practices-autorite-de-la-concurrence-fines-four-companies-engineering
[6] Available at: https://acco.gencat.cat/web/.content/80_acco/documents/arxius/actuacions/es-35-2024-20250219-competition-policy-and-labour-markets_eng.pdf
[7] Available at: https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/Dosya/is-gucu-piyasalarindaki-rekabet-ihlallerine-yonelik-kilavuz-ingilizce-20241203142507066.pdf
[8] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/businesses-handed-42-million-in-fines-following-freelancer-pay-investigation
[9] Available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/white-collar-executive-incarcerated-fixing-nurse-wages-and-fraud
[10] Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements (“Horizontal Guidelines”), OJ C 259, 21.7.2023, pp. 1-125, paragraph 279, and Guidelines on the application of Union competition law to collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons, OJ C 374, 30.9.2022, pp. 2-13, paragraph 17, example 2.
[11] Competing for talent What businesses need to know when recruiting workers and setting pay and other working conditions, 9 September 2025
[12] https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/Dosya/is-gucu-piyasalarindaki-rekabet-ihlallerine-yonelik-kilavuz-ingilizce-20241203142507066.pdf para. 17
[13] Competing for talent – What businesses need to know when recruiting workers and setting pay and other working conditions, 9 September 2025
[14] https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/Dosya/is-gucu-piyasalarindaki-rekabet-ihlallerine-yonelik-kilavuz-ingilizce-20241203142507066.pdf, para. 28
[15] Ibid.
[17] Competing for talent – What businesses need to know when recruiting workers and setting pay and other working conditions, 9 September 2025, p. 14
[18] Ibid, p. 6
[19] https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/Dosya/is-gucu-piyasalarindaki-rekabet-ihlallerine-yonelik-kilavuz-ingilizce-20241203142507066.pdf, para. 45
[20] Available at: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/adb27d8b-3dd8-4202-958d-198cf0740ce3_en
